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Trope bundle theories of substance (e.g. Williams 1953; 
Campbell 1990; Maurin 2002; Keinänen 2011, Keinänen & 
Hakkarainen 2010, 2014; Giberman 2014) aim to construct 
objects and all other entities by means of aggregates of tropes. 
Tropes are thin particular natures like a particular –e charge 
or a particular roundness in some location. Thus, tropes are 
themselves concrete in the sense of having some specific spa-
tial or spatio-temporal location. In trope theories, objects and 
all other particulars are constructed as mereological sums of 
tropes that fulfil certain conditions. For instance, objects are 
identified with mereological sums of mutually co-located 
(“concurrent” or “compresent”) tropes (cf. Williams 1953; 
Campbell 1990). The thin nature of a trope is contrasted with 
the thick nature of the object constituted by distinct tropes.1 
It has been customary to consider tropes as particularized 
qualities or particular properties of objects (cf. Armstrong 1989, 
Allen 2016). The standard ways to pick out and identify 
tropes as properties of objects (like the redness of some rose) 
have provided support to this intuitive conception.2 Never-
theless, being a particular property is a primitive category 
                                               
1 In Williams’ and Campbell’s classical trope theories, tropes are also con-
sidered as “abstract” in the sense of having capability of being co-located 
with other tropes, Fisher (2018, sec.1). 
2 As does Lowe (2003), we have distinguished between individuation in 
the epistemic sense (i.e., picking out an entity in our thought) and indi-
viduation in the metaphysical sense. (i.e., the determination of the identity 
conditions of an entity). Moreover, we defend the idea that tropes have 
primitive identity conditions, Keinänen & Hakkarainen (2014). 
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feature of modes, which primitively inhere in (or, characterize) 
objects.3 By contrast, most trope theories (i.e. trope bundle 
theories) aspire to analyze monadic inherence (objects having 
tropes), e.g., by means of parthood, co-location and/or exis-
tential dependencies.4 Therefore, being a property (or, being 
an object) is not left primitive.   
The trope theoretical analysis of monadic inherence can be 
regarded as a case of metaphysical reduction: in the analysis of 
inherence, a central feature of reality (objects having proper-
ties) is reduced to the holding of a fact about the basic entities 
of the category system (tropes). In the basic level, there are 
assumed to be only tropes that form objects if the respective 
aggregate of tropes fulfils certain conditions.5 Corresponding-
ly, the object has a trope as its property if and only if it has 
the trope as a certain kind of part. We may take a trope theo-
ry that identifies objects with mereological sums of co-located 
tropes as a simple example. Assume that object i is a 
mereological sum of three mutually co-located tropes t1, t2 
and t3, which are determinate quantities. Let t1 be a determi-
nate –e charge, t2 a determinate mass, and t3 a determinate 
spin quantum number. Object i has trope t1 as its property 
(i.e., i has a –e charge) if and only if i has trope t1 as its part 
and t1 is co-located with i. Thus, in the trope theoretical anal-
ysis of inherence, the reduction is assumed to take place in 
the general level of ontological categories: the facts about ob-
jects and properties are assumed to be identified with the 
facts about tropes and the complex entities tropes form. 
In trope theories, the “traditional” object-property dichot-
omy is explained away. Neither of these two categories – ob-
jects (entities characterized by properties) or properties 
                                               
3 Modes are introduced by the different substance attribute theorists in a 
two category ontology of substances and modes (cf. Martin 1980; Heil 
2012), or in Neo-Aristotelian four-category (Lowe 2006, 2009, 2015) and 
six-category (Ellis 2001) ontologies. 
4 For instance, classical trope theories (Williams 1953, Campbell 1990) 
analyze monadic inherence in terms of parthood and co-location: trope t is 
a property of object i if and only if t is a part of i and t is co-located with i. 
5 According to Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990), tropes are existential-
ly independent entities and objects are mereological sums of co-located 
(compresent, concurrent) tropes. Cf. Keinänen (2011, sec. 3) and Fisher 
(2018) for further discussion. 
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(entities inhering in or characterizing objects) – retains its sta-
tus as a basic category. Fundamentally, tropes are neither 
properties nor objects. Although tropes are conveniently 
identified (or picked out) as “properties of their bearers” (like 
e charge of a positron or redness of a rose), they are particular 
natures – entities of a single fundamental category – which 
constitute all (or almost all) other entities. 
Nevertheless, the trope theoretical analysis of inherence 
remains silent about relations or relational entities. Dealing 
with the question about the existence and ontological status 
of relations has turned out to be difficult for trope theorists. 
Most trope theorists have recently held either of the two main 
alternative views about relations, which, as I will argue, are 
both unsatisfactory. The first is the eliminativist view adopted 
by Keith Campbell (1990) and Peter Simons (2014, 2016), ac-
cording to which there are no relations or relational entities. 
Everything that exists is constituted by monadic tropes. 
Tropes are connected by different kinds of internal relations, 
but internal relations are not relational entities additional to 
their relata.6 Secondly, the advocates of the relata specific view 
- Anna-Sofia Maurin (2002, 2010, 2011), Jan-Willem Wieland 
and Arianna Betti (Wieland & Betti 2008; Betti 2015) - intro-
duce relational tropes in addition to monadic tropes.7 The 
existence of relational trope r is assumed to entail that r re-
lates (or, relationally inheres in) certain specific relata a and b. 
As I will argue in section 2, the relata specific view is un-
satisfactory because it re-introduces the primitive dichotomy 
between characterizing (relations) and characterized entities 
(objects) at the level of relations. According to the relata-
specific view, there are both primitively relating (relational 
tropes) and primitively related entities (objects). The relata-
specific view leaves relational inherence as a primitive formal 
ontological relation between relational tropes and their relata. 
Thus, a trope theorist adopting the relata specific view loses 
                                               
6 For different kinds of internal relations, cf. Keinänen, Keskinen & 
Hakkarainen (2017, sec.2). 
7 Officially, Wieland & Betti (2008) and Betti (2015) stay neutral between 
tropes and modes. Moreover, they allow for the possibility of relata spe-
cific relation universals. However, they work out their position by consid-
ering the relata specific entities as tropes. 
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one of the main benefits of trope theories, which is the gen-
eral analysis of inherence. In order to retain the initial attrac-
tion of trope theories, eliminativism might seem to be an 
appealing option. In section 3, I argue that eliminativism sets 
serious limitations to the ontological explanatory power of 
trope theories. In addition to spatio-temporal relations, the 
current scientific theories have introduced entities which are 
serious candidates for entities to be best categorized as rela-
tions or relation-like existents. 
Therefore, the main objective of section 4 is to present a 
new trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence. The 
aim is to offer a metaphysical reduction of relational inher-
ence, that trope r relates two or more entities. In other words, 
I reduce the holding of relational inherence to the obtaining 
of certain other relations in the trope theoretical category sys-
tem. The analysis generalizes the trope theoretical analysis of 
inherence provided by the Strong Nuclear theory (SNT) 
(Keinänen 2011; Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010, 2014) to rela-
tion-like tropes, r-tropes, for short. Section 5 deals with 
asymmetric and non-symmetric relations, which are a prima 
facie difficult case for the analysis, by assuming that all fun-
damental relations are quantities. Finally, in section 6, I pro-
vide a completely new account of the location of r-tropes. 
 
2. The relata specific view 
Anna-Sofia Maurin (2002, 2010, 2011), Jan-Willem Wieland & 
Arianna Betti (2008) and Betti (2015) have recently made an 
important contribution to trope ontology by defending rela-
tional tropes.8 According to their view, relational tropes are 
primitively relating and relata specific entities. Assume that 
trope r is a relata-specific relational trope of 1 m distance be-
tween two objects a and b. Although there are minor differ-
ences in the different formulations of the relata specific view, 
a relata specific relational trope r is assumed to fulfil the fol-
lowing three conditions: 
                                               
8 However, Betti (2015, 100ff.) considers her defense of the relata specific 
view conditional: if we must introduce relations at all, the relata specific 
view constitutes the best account of relations. 
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1. Necessarily, if relational trope r exists, its relata, a and b, also 
exist. To put this in formal ontological terms, trope r is multi-
ply rigidly dependent (only) on its relata, a and b.9 
2. Necessarily, if trope r exists, r relates (i.e., relationally inheres in) 
some relata. 
3. Necessarily, if trope r exists, r relates (relationally inheres in) its 
specific relata, a and b. 
Thus, according to the relata specific view of relational tropes 
(henceforth, the relata specific view), necessarily, if trope r ex-
ists, objects a and b are in a 1 m distance from each other. In 
other words, the sole existence of a relational trope is consid-
ered to entail that certain relational fact obtains. 
The relata specific relational tropes are introduced in order 
to avoid the modal version of Bradley’s regress, in which the 
condition that starts the regress is formulated in modal terms. 
Assume that relational trope of 1 m distance r and its relata a 
and b exist. The general worry in this version of Bradley’s 
regress is that, prima facie, the existence of an external relation 
and its relata does not entail that the relation relates its relata. 
The postulation of additional relations – such as the relation 
of instantiation connecting the relation and its relata – would 
only transfer the problem to a higher level (Wieland & Betti 
2008; Maurin 2010, 2011). Relational tropes seem to solve the 
regress problem because the existence of certain relational 
trope r already entails that the relation between specific ob-
jects holds. For instance, the existence of 1 m distance trope r 
entails that objects a and b are in 1 m distance from each oth-
er. Because the existence of a and b does not entail the exist-
ence of r, the distance relation is contingent and external to its 
relata, objects a and b (Wieland & Betti 2008, sec.3). 
Returning to what the relata specific view entails, condi-
tions 1-3 are not independent of each other. It is fairly easy to 
observe that if relational trope r fulfils condition 3, it also sat-
                                               
9 Let “≤ “ be a relation of improper parthood between entities and “E!” 
the predicate of (singular) existence. “SRD (e,f)” = e is strongly rigidly 
dependent on f. The multiple rigid dependence of t on f and g, ”MRD (t, 
(f, g)”, can be presented as follows: MRD (t, (f, g)) =  □ (E!t → (E!f ∧ E!g ∧ 
¬(f ≤ t) ∧ ¬(g ≤ t) ∧ ¬(f ≤ g) ∧ ¬(g ≤ f))) ∧  ¬ (□ E!f) ∧ ¬ (□ E!g) ∧ ¬ (SRD(f, 
g)) ∧ ¬ (SRD (g, f)).  
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isfies the two first conditions. Trivially, if trope r relates cer-
tain specific relata, trope r relates some relata (3 entails 2). 
Moreover, the holding of a relation between specific relata 
entails that the relata exist. Therefore, assuming that r is a 
relata specific relational trope – that the existence of r is suffi-
cient to its relating objects a and b – entails that r is also mul-
tiply rigidly dependent on a and b (3 entails 1). However, the 
converse does not hold (1 does not entail 3): multiple rigid 
dependence of trope s on two entities a and b does not entail 
that s relates these two entities.10 
The last-mentioned point requires some discussion be-
cause there has been confusion about the role of multiple rig-
id dependence in the metaphysical explanation of relata 
specificity. Multiple rigid dependence (MRD, for short) is a 
formal ontological relation that connects mereologically disjoint 
contingent existents. MRD spells out how its relata can exist 
as the constituents of the world. However, the constraints 
MRD sets on its relata are minimal: necessarily, if entity s ex-
ists (somewhere, somewhen), then its dependees a and b also 
exist (somewhere, somewhen). In addition to holding be-
tween a relational trope and its relata, MRD can hold between 
events and the specific objects involved in these events or 
between borders and the objects confined by these borders, 
for instance. In order to distinguish between different kinds 
of entities which are multiply rigidly dependent on some 
other entities (e.g., between borders and relational tropes), we 
are obliged to provide a more detailed description of their 
category features. 
According to the relata specific view, it is a primitive cate-
gory feature of relational tropes that they relationally inhere 
in (i.e., relate) certain specific relata. In other words, specific 
relational inherence is not analyzed further and it is supposed 
to be a primitive formal ontological relation connecting its 
relata.11 Specific relational inherence fixes the categorial na-
                                               
10 As MacBride (2011, 173) observes, “[n]ecessary coexistence of a relation 
and its terms is not enough to ensure that the relation holds between its 
terms”.  To be more exact, the holding of 1 does not guarantee that r is a 
relational trope and that 3 holds. 
11 The most explicit advocates of the relata specific view, Wieland & Betti 
(2008) do not directly characterize specific relational inherence (“relating 
specific entities”) as a formal ontological relation. However, they assume 
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ture of relational tropes as a specific kind of relational acci-
dent (e.g., in contradistinction to borders and events). This 
formal ontological relation spells out what general kind of 
entities relational tropes are and how they can exist as con-
stituents of the world.12 The primitive relational inherence is 
comparable to the formal relation of characterization (“mo-
nadic inherence”) between modes (particular properties) and 
objects E.J. Lowe (2006, 2009, 2015) introduces in his Four-
Category Ontology (cf. Keinänen 2018, sec.3). Like characteri-
zation, specific relational inherence is considered to be an in-
ternal relation: necessarily, if given entities occurring in 
specific relational inherence (a relational trope and its relata) 
exist, specific relational inherence holds between its relata. 
The advocates of the relata specific view claim to avoid Brad-
ley’s relation regress by assuming that the existence of the 
entities connected by specific relational inherence is sufficient 
to the holding of specific relational inherence.13 
The relata specific view faces three serious difficulties. The 
first is that the relata specific view introduces particular rela-
tions (i.e. relational tropes) as a primitive ontological catego-
ry. In other words, it introduces a distinction between 
primitively relating and primitively related entities. This dis-
tinction is parallel to the primitive distinction between modes 
and objects (particular attributes and substances).14 One of 
the central motivations of trope theory is to eliminate the sub-
stance attribute distinction by means of the analysis of inher-
ence (cf. Campbell 1990, secs. 1.1-1.6). If trope theorists must 
re-introduce a parallel distinction in the case of relational 
tropes, this seriously reduces the attraction of trope theories. 
Moreover, there are two more specific problems, which are 
closely connected to the first. The first of these problems is a 
consequence of the fact that specific relational inherence en-
                                                                                                           
it to be a part of the nature of relational tropes (as entities belonging to a 
certain category) that they relate certain specific relata (ibid, sec. 3). 
12 Cf. Hakkarainen & Keinänen (2017) and Hakkarainen (2018) for more 
on formal ontological relations. 
13 By using our terminology (cf. Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, 
sec. 2), specific relational inherence is assumed to be a basic internal rela-
tion between its relata. 
14 Particular properties or modes are recently advocated, e.g., by Lowe 
(2006, 2009, 2015), Ellis (2001) and Heil (2012). 
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tails multiple rigid dependence, but the converse does not 
hold. One can ask: can we find an analysis for relational in-
herence by means of multiple rigid dependence and some 
additional condition? Like the analysis of monadic inherence, 
such an analysis would reduce the number of the primitive 
formal ontological relations needed in trope theory. Moreo-
ver, one could bring much-needed clarity to the category sys-
tem by analyzing relational inherence by means of more 
transparent primitive notions (such as parthood and rigid 
dependence). Since the relata specific view leaves relational 
inherence as a primitive formal ontological relation, the op-
portunity for a further trope theoretical clarification of the 
category system is lost in the case of relational inherence. 
The third problem concerns the spatial or spatio-temporal 
location of relational tropes. Most trope theorists are inclined 
to adopt the ontological view that all entities are spatio-
temporal particulars, which Peter Simons (2010, 207; 2016, 
113) calls “naturalistic nominalism”. Thus, let us assume that 
also relational tropes have a spatio-temporal (or, at least a 
temporal) location. Assume that r is a 1 m distance trope re-
lating objects a and b. Trope r is determining the location of 
other entities, but it is difficult to determine the location of r 
(cf. Simons 2003, sec.2). The advocates of relational tropes 
have not provided any answer to this difficulty. This is unsat-
isfactory because relational inherence seems to entail re-
strictions to the location of relational tropes – for instance, 
that relational tropes are at least temporally co-located with 
their relata. Since we are unaware of the exact consequences 
of relational inherence, this casts doubt on using relational 
inherence as a basic notion of an ontological category system. 
 
3. Eliminativism 
According to eliminativism (Campbell (1990; Simons 2014, 
2016), there are no relations – relational tropes or any other 
kind of relational entities. Thus, relations (or, relational 
tropes) are eliminated as a fundamental category.15 The world 
                                               
15 Earlier, Simons (2003, 2010) postulated entities he called “relational 
tropes”. Nevertheless, Simons’ “relational tropes” are relational accidents, 
entities multiply rigidly dependent on two or more entities. He does not 
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is constituted by monadic tropes, which are particular na-
tures. 
Because of the serious problems of the relata specific view, 
the adoption of eliminativism with respect to relations might 
seem to be an attractive option for trope theorists.16 Neverthe-
less, I will argue in this section that eliminativism is, if not 
provably false, at least a very risky position for two main rea-
sons. The first is that eliminativism seriously restricts the 
available options in providing a trope theoretical account of 
space/space-time. Secondly, eliminativism seems to block 
natural ways to categorize many entities introduced in scien-
tific theories as relations or relation-like beings. 
Considering first the metaphysics of space/space-time, 
spatio-temporal relations are widely considered as external 
relations between objects. In other words, their holding is 
contingent relative to the existence of their relata. Since 
eliminativists deny the existence of relations, they would be 
obliged to consider (contingent) spatio-temporal relations 
derived internal relations, internal relations that hold due to the 
holding of the internal relations between entities some of 
which are distinct from the relata of the original relation 
(Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, sec. 2). For in-
stance, having the same mass as between objects a and b is a 
derived internal relation, which holds because of a and b hav-
ing equal (“exactly similar”) mass tropes as their certain 
kinds of parts. Similarly, the spatial distance between objects 
a and b might be contingent relative to the existence of a and b 
if there are certain additional, mutually internally related en-
tities also internally related to both a and b. 
Most of the recent eliminativist views about relations have 
been committed to a substantivalist theory of space/space-time (a 
substantivalist view for short): the claim that space-time points, 
regions of space-time or space-time itself are primitive object-
like entities.17 The general idea of these eliminativist accounts 
                                                                                                           
bestow them with any additional category features. Therefore, Simons’ 
earlier account of relational tropes is seriously incomplete (cf. note 10). 
16  Certain advocates of primitive substances, such as Heil (2012, 2016) and 
Lowe (2016), have also proposed strategies to avoid the postulation of 
relations. 
17 Lowe’s (2016) otherwise interesting account is a case in point. Mulligan 
(1996) avoids commitment to (“thick”) spatio-temporal relations by as-
170   Markku Keinänen 
 
is that the spatio-temporally related entities stand in some 
internal relations (such as identity or monadic inherence) to 
(the parts of) the space-time structure. The contingency of 
spatio-temporal relations is either explained by means of the 
contingent existence of the space-time structure or simply 
denied. Since trope theories strive to eliminate objects (in the 
sense of bearers of properties or relations) as a primitive cate-
gory, a trope theorist adopting a substantivalist view would 
be obliged to construct space/space-time by means of tropes. 
No clear idea of such construction has been presented so far. 
Substantivalist theories of space/space-time typically allow 
for the existence of empty space-time points. No 
substantivalist trope theorist has managed to show that emp-
ty space-time points can be constructed by means of tropes. 
Thus, an anti-substantivalist or a relationalist theory of 
space/space-time might seem to be a preferable view for the 
trope theorist.18 Peter Simons (2016) has proposed a construc-
tion of space-time by means of internal relations among the 
fundamental concrete entities. This view is better character-
ized as an anti-substantivalist than a relationalist account of 
space-time because it does not introduce any relations or oth-
er relational entities. Instead, Simons assumes that funda-
mental entities are occurrents (i.e., processes and events) 
having their spatio-temporal locations necessarily. All stand-
ard continuants (or, endurants) are Fregean abstractions from 
occurrents.19 Moreover, he assumes a causal theory of time. 
Simons’ general claim that all fundamental particulars are 
occurrents is contestable and his examples of the construction 
                                                                                                           
suming space-time points, which have tropes as their individual acci-
dents. Although being a trope theorist, Campbell is also inclined to adopt 
a substantivalist theory of space-time. In his Abstract Particulars (1990), 
Campbell rejects his earlier (Campbell 1981) identification of tropes with 
“formed volumes”, i.e., parts or regions of space/space-time. In his final, 
scientifically inspired version of trope theory, Campbell takes space-time 
as a single simple entity, and all other entities are fields in the same space-
time manifold (1990, 145ff.).  
18 All theories of space/space-time that deny the existence space/space-
time or its parts as a separate substance(s) are anti-substantivalist. 
19 Cf. Simons (2000, 2008) for a proposal to construct continuant objects as 
Fregean abstractions from occurrents.  
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of continuants from occurrents have remained schematic.20 
Even if all fundamental entities were occurrents, we would 
need additional reasons to support the claim that occurrents 
have their specific locations necessarily. It might be tempting 
to individuate processes and events by their spatio-temporal 
location, but it is not clear whether such intuitions about in-
dividuation are applicable to a process ontology like the one 
suggested by Simons.21 It seems to be a safer alternative for a 
trope theorist to adopt a relationalist theory of 
space/spacetime, which takes (some of the) spatio-temporal 
relations as relational entities. One can reconcile this full-
blown relationalist theory of space/space-time with a more 
standard view that the same entities could have had different 
locations or relative positions. In other words, the spa-
tial/spatio-temporal relations between entities are contingent 
relative to the existence of their relata. 
Finally, the current science and the current quantum phys-
ics in particular provide trope theorists independent reasons 
to postulate relations or relation-like entities. The current 
quantum physics introduces entangled states of two- or mul-
ti-particle systems, which are serious candidates for funda-
mental relations between particles (cf. Teller 1986; Karakostas 
2009). For instance, Paul Teller (1986, sec.4) has argued that 
entangled spin-states of two superposed electrons are best 
considered as relations, which do not supervene on the 
spatio-temporal arrangement and the monadic properties of 
these particles. In the context of trope theory, these entangled 
spin-states would be good candidates for relational tropes (cf. 
Keinänen 2011, 434). Additionally, a trope theorist may need 
to introduce relational tropes to account for the “emergent” 
features of complex objects, that is, the features of complex 
objects which do not supervene on the properties of their 
proper parts.22 Finally, the present-day quantum physics in-
                                               
20 For instance, Simons’ (2000) examples of constructed continuants are 
complex objects. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether we would need 
continuant objects not reducible to occurrents as proper parts of complex 
objects.  
21 Cf. MacBride (2016, ch.2) for a brief criticism of Simons’ eliminativism. 
22 One possible example of such emergent properties are masses of com-
plex physical particles like helium atoms, which cannot be directly re-
duced to the masses of their proper parts. I have suggested elsewhere that 
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troduces virtual particles (such as photons and gluons) to ac-
count for interactions between micro-particles (electrons, 
quarks). It is an interesting, a hitherto unstudied option to 
consider such interactions relational tropes. 
Even this limited set of examples shows that there is rea-
sonable work for relational tropes in an a posteriori orientat-
ed trope theory. Most importantly, relational tropes (or tropes 
which would function like relational tropes) would bestow 
trope theory with the required ontological explanatory power 
to respond to the challenge of the different, currently popular 
relational ontologies. Given the serious difficulties the relata-
specific relational tropes face, the trope theorist is advised to 
seek for a reductive analysis of relational inherence. 
 
4. The analysis of relational inherence 
The basic idea in the reductive analysis of relational inher-
ence is to generalize the trope theoretical analysis of monadic 
inherence to “relational tropes”. In the analysis of relational 
inherence, the general goal is to provide a metaphysical re-
duction of relational inherence: to identify the facts about two 
or more entities being connected by a relation with the facts 
about the entities of the trope theoretical category system. 
Since relational inherence is explained away, also relational 
tropes (i.e. primitively relating entities) are eliminated from 
trope theory. However, certain tropes, which I call “r-tropes”, 
take the role of relational entities in the present account. The 
main difference between standard “property tropes” and r-
tropes is their standing in slightly different kinds of formal 
ontological relations and being parts of different kinds of 
complex entities. Nevertheless, there is no such thing as a 
primitive category distinction between primitively character-
izing entities (properties), on the one hand, and primitively 
relating entities (relations), on the other.23 
                                                                                                           
such emergent properties are best categorized as relational tropes, cf. 
Keinänen (2011, 447). 
23 The entities belonging to the same category bear the same formal onto-
logical relations to themselves and to certain other entities. These formal 
ontological relations are internal relations – necessarily, if certain entities 
exist, it is a primitive fact about them that certain formal ontological rela-
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Hence, the reductive analysis will have two main goals: the 
first is to eliminate the primitive distinction between relational 
tropes and their relata, which threatens to set serious limita-
tions to the ontological explanatory power of trope theories. 
The second goal is to incorporate the relation-like entities, 
which are capable of serving the core functions set to rela-
tions in an a posteriori basis, into the trope theoretical 
framework. My goal will not be to deal with all conceivable 
cases of relations. In order for the reductive analysis of rela-
tional inherence to serve its purpose, it suffices to consider 
credible a posteriori examples of relational entities and sub-
mit their relational inherence to reductive analysis. 
Recall that the different trope bundle theories analyze mo-
nadic inherence in different ways. For the present purposes, it 
suffices to consider two trope theories. Campbell’s (1990) 
theory takes objects as mereological sums of mutually co-
located (“compresent”) tropes. Correspondingly, trope t in-
heres in object i if and only if t is a part of i and t is co-located 
with i.24 
By contrast, in the trope theory SNT (Keinänen 2011; 
Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010, 2014), tropes are assumed to 
be mutually existentially dependent beings and objects are 
constituted as aggregates of tropes connected by the formal 
ontological relations of rigid and generic dependence.25 Here, 
I confine myself to outlining the features of the SNT directly 
relevant to the present discussion.26 According to the SNT, 
every object has either a single nuclear trope or, alternatively, 
two or more tropes rigidly dependent on each other, the nu-
                                                                                                           
tions hold, cf. Hakkarainen (2018) for this kind of account of ontological 
categories. 
24 Since Campbell (1990, secs. 4.3-4.4) constructs complex quantity tropes 
as “conjunctive compresences” of simpler tropes falling under the same 
determinable, an additional maximality condition would be needed to be 
added to the analysis in order to deal with such mutually co-located 
tropes forming a complex trope. 
25 Let “≤ “ be a relation of improper parthood and  “E!” the predicate of 
(singular) existence. Entity e is strongly rigidly dependent on entity f, if 
the following condition holds: ¬(□ E!f) & □ ((E!e → E!f) & ¬( f ≤ e )), cf. 
Simons (1987, 112, 294ff.). 
26 Cf. Keinänen (2011, sec. 4) for a more systematic presentation of the 
SNT. 
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clear tropes.27 Nuclear tropes are necessary parts of an object i 
and, intuitively, constitute its “necessary properties”. Trope t 
is a part of object i if and only if t is rigidly dependent only on 
the nuclear tropes of i. Object i is a dependence closure of tropes 
with respect to rigid dependence.28 Because object i is a de-
pendence closure of tropes, i is not rigidly dependent on any 
entity which not its proper part.29 
Unlike Campbell’s trope theory, the SNT does not build 
objects by means of co-location (“compresence”) but uses the 
relations of existential dependence.30 The second major dif-
ference between these two trope theories concerns the deter-
mination of the location of individual tropes. In Campbell’s 
trope theory, individual tropes are relata of the basic spatio-
temporal relations, whereas in the SNT, this function is given 
to certain trope bundles. According to the SNT, the certain 
kinds of aggregates of tropes (e.g. the nuclear tropes of a sub-
stance) form individuals, which are minimal relata of the 
basic spatio-temporal relations. The spatio-temporal locations 
of these complex entities determine the locations of their con-
stituent tropes. In a simple case, object i is constituted solely 
by its nuclear tropes and the location of i determines the loca-
tion of the tropes that are its proper parts. The SNT analyzes 
monadic inherence in this special case as follows: trope t is a 
                                               
27 According to the SNT, trope t is a nuclear trope if and only if 1) t is not 
rigidly dependent on any other trope (a single nuclear trope), or 2) t is 
rigidly dependent on certain trope(s) which are also rigidly dependent on 
t (two or more nuclear tropes). 
28 A dependence closure of tropes with respect to rigid dependence is a 
plurality of tropes in which all rigid dependencies of the tropes in the 
plurality are fulfilled. Moreover, we assume that necessarily, if these 
tropes exist, they form an individual.  As a consequence, that individual is 
not rigidly dependent on any mereologically disjoint entity, cf. Keinänen 
(2011, 446-447). 
29 The applicability of the notion of rigid dependence is restricted to con-
tingent existents cf. note 25. Moreover, as advocates of naturalistic nomi-
nalism (cf. section 3), trope theorists can reject the existence of sets, on 
which objects would (allegedly) be rigidly dependent. 
30 Here, I offer only a simplified sketch of the construction of objects in the 
SNT. 
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property of object i if and only if, necessarily, if t exists, t is a 
proper part of i and t is co-located with i 31 
In what follows, my strategy is to generalize the analysis of 
monadic inherence of the trope theory SNT to r-tropes. More-
over, the analysis will adopt one of the main assumptions of 
the relata specific answer, namely, that r-tropes are multiply 
rigidly dependent (MRD, for short) on two or more entities. 
Since multiple rigid dependence is not sufficient to relational 
inherence, we need to specify additional conditions that hold 
of trope r and objects a and b if r relationally inheres in a and 
b. Rigid dependence will be supplemented by the condition 
of necessary co-location as we will see below. Although the 
analysis of relational inherence is based on the idea that r-
tropes are dependent existents, it is purported to be con-
sistent with considering tropes other than r-tropes existential-
ly independent as Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990) do. 
Thus, r-tropes are multiply rigidly dependent (MRD) on two 
or more entities. Assume, for instance, that r-trope r is a 1 m 
distance trope connecting entities a and b: a and b are in a 1 m 
distance from each other. Trope r is MRD on a and b. This 
multiple rigid dependence involves three things. First, neces-
sarily, if distance trope r exists, entities a and b (its “relata”) 
also exist. Second, entities a and b are mereologically disjoint 
and mereologically disjoint from r. In other words, r-tropes 
connect mutually “wholly distinct” (mereologically disjoint) 
entities and are wholly distinct from the entities which they 
connect, their “relata”. Third, entities a and b are not rigidly 
dependent on each other. The third condition rules out the 
cases in which trope r is rigidly dependent on the nuclear 
tropes of a single object. Finally, in order to rule out trivial 
cases (e.g., in which the dependees a or b are necessary exist-
ents), it is presupposed in the characterization of MRD that 
trope r and entities a and b are all contingent existents.32 
                                               
31 Keinänen (2011, 438-440). The more general condition, which also deals 
with the tropes contingent to an object, is temporally qualified: necessar-
ily, trope t is co-located with i when it exists (ibid. 440ff.). 
32 The characterization of rigid dependence and multiple rigid depend-
ence are thus restricted to contingent existents, cf. Simons (1987, 294ff.) for 
a similar restriction. 
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The crucial step in the analysis is to add three more condi-
tions in order to obtain the conclusion that trope r relates, that 
is, relationally inheres in a and b. The first two conditions 
concern the constitution of an r-complex. The first is that a 
and b are the only entities on which trope r is rigidly depend-
ent, r is rigidly dependent only on a and b. Secondly, trope r 
together with its dependees (“relata”), a and b, form an indi-
vidual, which I call an “r-complex rab”.33 R-complex rab is a 
dependence closure of its proper parts with respect to rigid 
dependence. As a dependence closure of its parts, r-complex 
rab is itself a strongly rigidly independent entity, it is not rig-
idly dependent on any entity that is mereologically disjoint 
from rab. Hence, r-complexes are substances in the weak 
sense of being strongly independent particulars and individuals. 
The third condition is that r-complex rab is a spatio-
temporally located entity: r-complex rab has a spatio-
temporal location and its location determines the location of 
its constituent r-trope, 1 m distance trope r. Like the objects 
constituted by their nuclear tropes, an r-complex is a strongly 
independent particular and has all of its proper parts neces-
sarily. Moreover, as in the case of objects having only nuclear 
tropes, the location of the r-complex determines the location 
of its existentially dependent part, r-trope r. As we will see 
below, some, but not all, r-complexes are entities that figure 
in the basic spatio-temporal relations and have an independ-
ent location in this sense. Again, they are like objects consti-
tuted by nuclear tropes. On the basis of these assumptions, I 




Trope r relationally inheres in a and b if and only if: 
1. r is multiply rigidly dependent (MRD) on a and b, but not 
rigidly dependent on any entity that is not a part of a or a 
part of b. 
2. a and b are not rigidly dependent on r. 
3. a is not rigidly dependent on b, and b is not rigidly de-
pendent on a. 
                                               
33 Note that every r-complex is an individual and a mereological sum of 
its parts (e.g., r + a + b = s). 
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4. r, a and b constitute an individual, r-complex rab. 
5. Necessarily, if r exists, r is exactly co-located with rab. 
 
Let us take again 1 m distance trope r as an example. Trope r 
relates (relationally inheres in) a and b, if r is both multiply 
rigidly dependent on a and b and necessarily (exactly) co-
located with r-complex rab, which is a mereological sum of all 
these three entities (i.e., r+a+b).34 
The purpose of [RI] is to generalize the analysis of monadic 
inherence of the trope theory SNT to r-tropes, that is, the 
tropes that fulfil clauses 1-3 of [RI]. This generalization is 
achieved by assuming that the corresponding r-complex, 
whose existence is entailed by the existence of r, is an indi-
vidual having a specific spatio-temporal location. Moreover, 
like the location of an individual constituted by mutually rig-
idly dependent tropes (nuclear tropes), the location of the r-
complex determines the location of its existentially dependent 
parts (an r-trope in this special case). Thus, necessarily, if r-
trope r exists, it is co-located with rab. As a consequence, 
trope r fulfills the conditions of monadic inherence in relation 
to complex rab: necessarily, if r exists, r is a (proper) part of 
rab and r is co-located with rab. Thus, r is a monadic property 
of complex rab. According to [RI], by being a monadic prop-
erty of r-complex rab, trope r also relationally inheres in a and 
b. 
In order to motivate this analysis of relational inherence, it 
is useful to begin with the idea of tropes as particular natures 
(-e charges, 1 m lengths, etc.). According to the analyses of 
monadic inherence discussed above, tropes are monadic 
properties of an individual because they are mutually co-
located parts of that individual, which might also need to ful-
fil some additional conditions (as in the SNT). R-tropes, like 1 
m distance trope r, are particular natures co-located with the 
corresponding r-complexes and monadic properties of these 
r-complexes. Furthermore, r-trope r is a certain kind of entity 
that connects mutually distinct entities, a and b, into a certain 
kind of more inclusive whole. In order to see this, we need to 
observe three things. First, trope r and complex rab are (weak-
                                               
34 In what follows, I leave out the qualification, although I refer to exact 
co-location when talking about “co-location”. 
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ly) rigidly dependent on a and b. Thus, second, given that 
trope r exists, a and b are parts of a certain kind of r-complex, 
rab. Third, since a and b are proper parts of complex rab, their 
locations are parts of the location of rab.35 Consequently, loca-
tions of a and b are parts of the location of trope r. 
Hence, according to [RI], tropes relate (relationally inhere 
in) their relata by being properties of the respective r-
complexes (“relational complexes”), which have their relata 
as proper parts. In the special case discussed just above, trope 
r (1 m distance trope r) relates entities a and b in a certain way 
because r “makes” a and b as parts of a certain kind of com-
plex individual, 1 m distance r-complex rab. 
 
5. Asymmetric and non-symmetric relations 
An obvious worry with [RI] concerns asymmetric and non-
symmetric relations. Causal relations, relations of spatial direc-
tion (such as being to the left of) and temporal direction (be-
ing after than) are salient examples of asymmetric relations. 
Many relations between quantitative properties (such as be-
ing greater than or equal to), some spatial relations (facing) 
and relations manifesting human attitudes (admiring, loving) 
are non-symmetric without being asymmetric. Prima facie, 
asymmetric and non-symmetric relations hold between enti-
ties in a certain order (cf. Fine 2000, 1).  For instance, 
Muodoslompolo is to north of Tornio but Tornio is not to 
north of Muodoslompolo (asymmetry); Young Werther loves 
Charlotte, but Charlotte does not love Werther (non-
symmetry). It seems that [RI] is not able to deal with non-
symmetric or asymmetric relations because r-tropes do not 
themselves bestow any order on the parts of r-complexes. 
Therefore, it seems that clause [RI] can only provide us with 
an account of the special cases of relational inherence in 
which the relation under consideration is symmetric (e.g., the 
relational tropes of spatial distance if there are such entities). 
As a consequence, if we accept the proposed analysis, we 
seem to be obliged to deny the existence of all asymmetric 
and non-symmetric relations. This is an untenable conclusion 
                                               
35 As Parsons (2007, 213) argues, all concrete entities satisfy the following 
principle of Expansivity: the spatial location of a whole is as least as inclu-
sive as the spatial location of its proper parts. 
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if we take seriously the examples of relations the empirical 
science gives us (cf. MacBride 2014, sec.1, 2016, sec. 4). 
Nevertheless, some of the above examples are basic or de-
rived internal relations, which do not exist as separate relation-
al entities. Rather, tropes and complex entities they constitute 
are internally related in different ways.36 In section 3, I al-
ready mentioned derived internal relations. Having a greater 
mass than or having a smaller charge than are examples of 
asymmetric derived internal relations, which hold between ob-
jects having certain kinds of mass or charge tropes as their 
parts. Moreover, the quantity tropes falling under a determi-
nable (e.g. electric charge) are mutually connected by the dif-
ferent basic internal relations of proportion (e.g., 1:1 
proportion or -3:1 proportion) and the basic internal relation 
of order (greater than or equal to). These basic internal rela-
tions hold because tropes are certain thin particular natures - 
the existence of the related entities is a sufficient condition for 
their obtaining. Moreover, the holding of these relations does 
not depend, even indirectly, on the existence of any specific 
entities distinct from their original relata (Keinänen; Keskinen 
& Hakkarainen 2017, sec.3). Here, the relation of order is non-
symmetric, whereas the relations of proportion are symmetric 
or asymmetric. 
Formal ontological relations constitute additional exam-
ples of basic or derived internal relations.37 For instance, 
tropes are proper parts of objects, which is an asymmetric 
formal ontological relation. Moreover, in the SNT, all tropes 
constituting an object are connected by the non-symmetric 
formal ontological relation of rigid dependence. Asymmetric 
and non-symmetric basic or derived internal relations do not 
cause any problem for the present analysis: because they are 
not relational entities, internal relations do not relationally 
inhere in anything. Rather, it is a primitive fact about quanti-
ty tropes that they are ordered, that e charge tropes are great-
                                               
36 Cf. Keinänen; Keskinen & Hakkarainen (2017, sec.2) for a more precise 
characterization of the distinction between basic and derived internal 
relations. 
37 Cf. Hakkarainen & Keinänen (2017) for the distinction between formal 
ontological relations, which are “nature neutral”, and other basic internal 
relations. 
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er than e/3 charge tropes, for instance. Similarly, it is a primi-
tive fact about tropes that they are rigidly dependent on cer-
tain distinct tropes. 
Moreover, I adopt a sparse theory of relational entities, 
which is in line with a sparse theory of tropes (Campbell 
1990, sec. 1.8): there are only few different kinds of relational 
entities, which are all discovered empirically. An advocate of 
a sparse theory of relational entities can remain skeptical of 
the existence of any such macro-level relational entities as the 
relational tropes of love or macroscopic causation (Simons 
2003; Lowe 2016, 106-110). The best prima facie candidates for 
r-tropes are basic (or, comparatively basic) physical quanti-
ties. Among them, there are asymmetric vector quantities like 
momentum and asymmetric quantitative spatial and tem-
poral relations. 
Assuming that all r-tropes are quantities, we can present a 
general strategy to deal with their asymmetry. In this ac-
count, we need not assume that inherence of r-tropes is 
asymmetric. In order to take a simple example, consider dis-
tances in some direction in a one-dimensional space.38 As-
suming that there are distance-direction tropes, they are 
vector quantities, magnitudes with a certain direction. In 
predicate logic, the direction of an asymmetric relation is typ-
ically indicated by argument places. Thus, for instance, object 
a is 1 m to the left of object b, Lab. Sentence “Lba” can be used 
to indicate that b is 1 m to the left of a. Hence, a relational 
predicate applies to a pair of objects in different ways de-
pending on the direction of the corresponding relation. 
It is important to keep in mind that r-tropes do not have 
any formal-ontologically specified direction. First, r-tropes do 
not have any argument places, by means of which the relata 
are put into some order. Second, the source of the order of the 
relata cannot be the different ways in which an r-trope is mul-
tiply rigidly dependent on certain entities. There is only one 
and a unique way in which an r-trope is multiply rigidly de-
pendent on certain entities. 
                                               
38 Of course, space-time intervals have replaced distances as basic quanti-
ties in the current physical theories of space-time. Therefore, I present this 
example of distance direction tropes only as an illustration. 
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Nevertheless, the r-tropes of distance-direction are, as par-
ticular natures, determinate magnitude-directions (vectors). 
Like all quantity tropes falling under a determinable, the r-
tropes of distance-direction are mutually connected by the 
different basic internal relations of positive or negative pro-
portion (like, say 1:1 proportion or -3:1 proportion) and the 
basic internal relation of order (greater than or equal to). The 
choice of the unit for distance-direction is a matter of conven-
tion as well as which of these r-tropes of distance-direction 
get positive and which negative values. By contrast, because 
of being determined by the distance-direction tropes, the rela-
tions of proportion and order between distance-direction 
tropes remain invariant in all choices of the unit.39 
Whether two r-tropes of distance-direction are connected 
by a relation of positive or negative proportion spells out 
their relative directions. The r-tropes connected by some rela-
tion of negative proportion are distance-directions to oppo-
site directions, whereas the distance-direction r-tropes to the 
same direction are connected by some relation of positive 
proportion. Thus, according to the present approach, the di-
rection is already included in a distance-direction trope as a 
particular nature. Similarly, an r-complex having a distance-
direction trope as a proper part has an intrinsic direction de-
termined by the respective r-trope, which may be opposite to 
the direction of another r-complex. 
Hence, the present approach denies that r-tropes have any 
formal-ontologically determined (absolute or relative) direc-
tion. Unlike the recent views in the metaphysics of relations 
(e.g., positionalism or anti-positionalism), the present ap-
proach does not introduce any general (logical or formal-
ontological) devices to determine the relative direction of ar-
gument places (cf. Fine 2000, secs. 3-4; MacBride 2014). In-
stead, the direction of a relational fact is determined by an r-
trope as a particular nature.40 The present approach does not 
                                               
39 Cf. Keinänen; Keskinen & Hakkarainen (2017, sec.3) for a defense of the 
same general account of internal relations between quantity tropes falling 
under a determinable. 
40 Certain r-tropes have an absolute direction as vectors. However, the 
direction of an r-trope is based on its nature and it does not correspond to 
any fixed order of the relata figuring as arguments of a relation. Similarly, 
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over-generate directionality because the non-directional r-
tropes falling under a determinable (e.g., distance tropes if 
there are such entities) are related only by the relation of or-
der and the relations of positive proportion. 
The above kind of quantitative r-tropes are good prima fa-
cie candidates for truthmakers of asymmetric predications 
such as “a is 1 m to the left of b” or “b is 1 m to the right of a”. 
According to the present conception, these two sentences 
have the same truthmaker (i.e., some r-complex rab), but they 
correspond to the different ways in which the posi-
tive/negative unit of distance-direction can be selected. 
Nevertheless, the best current candidates for the basic 
spatio-temporal r-tropes are particular space-time intervals. 
They are mutually connected by the different relations of pos-
itive, negative or zero proportion. However, space-time in-
tervals do not have any intrinsic direction. Rather, the 
different kinds of intervals between objects in space-time 
points indicate, for instance, whether or not these space-time 
points can be involved in one temporally continuous succes-
sion of events. Thus, we are entitled to expect that asymmet-
ric predications like “a is before b” or “a causes b” do not 
have r-tropes as their sole truthmakers, but, rather, more 
complicated structures of entities, which may involve some r-
tropes.41 
  
6. The location of r-tropes  
According to clause [RI], an r-complex is an individual pos-
sessing certain spatial or spatio-temporal location, which de-
termines the location of the corresponding r-trope. An 
advocate of the present analysis of relational inherence is 
obliged to provide some account of the determination of the 
location of r-complexes. Providing an answer to this question 
is particularly important in the case of r-complexes partially 
constituted by spatial or spatio-temporal r-tropes. There is a 
threat of a regress of spatial or spatio-temporal r-tropes if we 
                                                                                                           
there is no fixed way to indicate this direction by means of the order of 
the argument places of a two-place predicate, for instance. 
41 For instance, the claims about temporal precedence of events might be 
made true by complicated physical facts involving the increase of total 
entropy in universe. 
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need to postulate additional r-tropes to account for the loca-
tion of every such r-complex. 
The second issue concerns the peculiar character of spatial 
r-tropes. As we saw above, spatial r-tropes are assumed to be 
distances or distance-directions between the different occu-
pants of space. We need no recourse to relational inherence in 
the formal-ontological characterization of the r-complexes 
partially constituted by the spatial r-tropes. Nevertheless, 
since spatial r-tropes are assumed to be distances between ob-
jects, one might claim that being a relation is smuggled into 
the (non-formal) nature of r-tropes.42 In what follows, I deal 
with these two issues concerning the spatial or spatio-
temporal r-tropes and the respective r-complexes first. Final-
ly, I address the determination of the location of r-complexes 
constituted by means of other kinds of r-tropes. 
The current metaphysical discussion of space-time is, in 
large part, still dominated by the rivalry between 
substantivalist and relationalist theories about space-time.43 
According to the contemporary substantivalists, space-time is 
an independently existing entity of its own, which is consti-
tuted by space-time points having certain inertial features like 
curvature (Teller 1991, 363-4, 379). Relationalism (or, “liberal-
ized relationalism” as Teller calls it) introduces spatio-
temporal relations between actual objects and actual and pos-
sible objects. One is supposed to obtain the empty space-time 
points as locations of possible objects. Moreover, one is sup-
posed to be able to construct the whole space-time manifold 
(the system of space-time points) by means of spatio-
temporal relations (ibid). 
From the point of view of trope theory, both of 
substantivalism and relationalism about space-time are prob-
lematic views. In section 3, I already mentioned the difficulty 
of constructing empty space-time points by means of tropes. 
A related problem can be addressed to liberalized 
relationalism: it is reasonable to demand that relations can 
connect only entities that exist. Thus, relationalism is prima 
facie committed to the existence of possible but non-actual 
objects. The merely possible objects are needed as relata of 
                                               
42 I am grateful to Jani Hakkarainen for presenting this problem. 
43 For additional alternative accounts of space-time, cf. e.g., Pooley (2005). 
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spatio-temporal relations. It is difficult to present any account 
of the construction of merely possible objects from tropes, 
which are actual and spatio-temporal entities. As a conse-
quence, liberalized relationalism seems to be an equally un-
acceptable conception of space-time for a trope theorist as 
substantivalism, with which it is supposed to compete. 
Without solving the problem of empty space-time points 
here, I adopt a broadly relationalist conception of space-time. 
According to it, r-tropes, which correspond to spatio-
temporal relations, and the respective r-complexes constitute 
space-time (space might be used in illustrations). In other 
words, space-time is not considered as a separate object. Ra-
ther, space-time is a structure (wholly or partially) constitut-
ed by the mutually connected r-complexes. Although there 
are open issues in this type of view (like the status of empty 
space-time points if there are such items), it seems to provide 
us with a promising starting point for the construction of 
space-time from tropes. 
For purposes of illustration, let us consider space and spa-
tial relations between objects (distances or distance-
directions). Consider now a single r-complex rab, which is a 
part of space, that is, the r-complex which has trope r (certain 
particular distance or distance-direction), and objects a and b 
as its parts. We can identify r-trope r with the shortest path of 
space connecting a and b. Trope r is a particular nature, a cer-
tain length in space. By being rigidly dependent on a and b 
and co-located with the respective r-complex, trope r can ex-
ist only in presence of the contents of space (space-time). 
The location of r-complex rab is determined holistically, by 
its place in the system of spatial r-complexes. Assume that all 
other r-complexes than rab exist, among them the r-
complexes that overlap rab by having a or b as their parts. If 
these other r-complexes exist, there must also be an r-
complex connecting a and b. In other words, there must be an 
r-complex which has the same position in the network of r-
complexes as rab. If rab exists, it has this specific position. 
Thus, the system of r-complexes determines the location of 
rab as a part of space. 
It is possible to make additional assumptions, which con-
strain the nature of r-complex rab or any other r-complex hav-
ing the same place in the system of r-complexes. In a special 
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case of Euclidean space, the other existing r-complexes are 
parts of space and the spatial relations between a and other 
objects, and b and other objects are sufficient to necessitate 
the fact that a and b are connected by a r-trope (particular dis-
tance or distance-direction) of a certain determinate kind. 
However, the structure of space may have local variation, 
which allows for a and b to be connected by different kinds of 
r-tropes. The identification of relational tropes with paths of 
space (space-time) solves the location problem of spatial 
(spatio-temporal) r-tropes: they are concrete entities that con-
tribute to constituting space (space-time). 
The second problem concerns the alleged primitive relat-
edness included in the nature of a spatial r-trope. In response, 
one can avoid primitive relatedness in the following way: 
objects a and b are parts of r-complex rab. Because of being 
proper parts of the distinct r-complexes, the locations of these 
objects, a and b, are proper parts of the locations of the dis-
tinct r-complexes. The r-complexes, which have an object as a 
proper part, assign to the object a determinate location as an 
intersection of the locations of these r-complexes. Therefore, 
we need not assume that an r-complex determines a primitive 
between-ness relation connecting objects a and b; rather, the 
system of r-complexes determines that objects a and b are in a 
certain distance (distance-direction) from each other.44 
In the end of section 3, I provided some prima facie exam-
ples of relational entities such as entangled spin-states of 
multi-particle systems, emergent properties of complex ob-
jects and virtual particles. They are both good candidates for 
r-tropes and spatially located entities. It seems that the re-
spective r-complexes are independently located entities and 
that their locations can be determined by spatial/spatio-
temporal r-tropes. Of course, the specific details of such an 
account must be worked out in distinct cases. 
 
  
                                               
44 One might claim that r-complexes self-locate (are their own locations). 
However, this not quite right because we need the whole system of r-
complexes for an r-complex to have a specific location. 
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7. Conclusion 
Because of the reductive analysis of monadic inherence (ob-
jects having tropes), trope theories have promised to analyze 
away the primitive dichotomy between characterizing (prop-
erties) and characterized entities (objects). As I argued in sec-
tion 2, the best trope theoretical account of relations, the 
relata specific view, re-introduces the same dichotomy at the 
level of relations. This is unsatisfactory and it reduces the ini-
tial appeal of trope theories. Nevertheless, we need relation-
like entities in an adequate conception of the categorial struc-
ture of reality, which rules out eliminativism about relations 
(section 3). 
Therefore, in section 4, I presented a novel trope theoretical 
analysis of relational inherence, which is a generalization of 
the analysis of monadic inherence provided by the trope the-
ory SNT. The analysis provides us with a metaphysical re-
duction of relational inherence to the facts about the entities 
of the trope theoretical category system. The core feature of 
the analysis is to introduce multiply rigidly dependent 
tropes, which I call r-tropes. Like all tropes, r-tropes are par-
ticular natures with a specific location. If r-trope r is multiply 
rigidly dependent on objects a and b, entities r, a and b form a 
complex individual, r-complex rab. An r-complex is a con-
crete particular and the location of r-complex rab determines 
the location of r. R-trope r relationally inheres in entities a 
and b by unifying them into r-complex rab and by being co-
located with rab. For instance, since 1 m distance trope r uni-
fies objects a and b into complex rab, objects a and b are in 1 m 
distance from each other. 
In section 5, I argued that the present analysis can deal 
with asymmetric and non-symmetric relations by assuming 
that all fundamental relations are quantities. Finally, section 6 
delivers an account of the determination of the location of r-
tropes also in the difficult case in which an r-trope contributes 
to determining the spatial or spatio-temporal location of ob-
jects.45  
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